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Seton Hall Law

THE EVOLUTION OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Jillian Sauchelli
INTRODUCTION:
The Endangered Species Act is often considered to be one of the most farreaching, and patently assertive federal statutes ever to be implemented by Congress. In
fact, at its passage, “the Endangered Species Act of 1973 represented the most
comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any
nation.”1 While its effects are arguably widespread and varied, its goal is decidedly
singular—to curb the rate of extinction of the planet’s endangered and threatened species.
While Section 7 of the Act applies to federal agencies and actors and their potential to
jeopardize endangered species, Sections 9 and 10 reach private actors as well.2 Despite
the Act’s clearly valuable goals, its initial application provoked a deluge of backlash and
outrage. Criticisms of the Act not only led to a damaged public perception, but also to
insubstantial and inconsistent application, potentially to the detriment of the endangered
species the Act aims to protect.
In this paper, I will explore the history and evolution of the Endangered Species
Act, from its early years of stringent application, the resulting backlash, and finally to the
Acts transformation into an adversary of industry and the general public. Through this
paper, I will seek to elucidate why the Act’s strict, comprehensive prohibitions ultimately
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Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (current version at
16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1988).
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overshadowed its vital intent with an examination of the downfalls of federal prohibitive
policy.
BACKGROUND:
1. The Act’s History and Construction
The Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966 and the Endangered Species
Conservation Act of 1969 both predated the Act as it is understood today.3 While all
three statutes were designed with the intent to preserve endangered species, it wasn’t until
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 that a practical tactic for the preservation of
endangered species was formulated.4 Specifically, Congress agreed that the two prior
acts did not provide “the kind of management tools needed to act early enough to save a
vanishing species.” 5 The Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966 intended to
create a program for the “conservation, protection, restoration, and propagation” of
endangered species. 6 In contrast, the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969 was
concerned with halting “the importation of and interstate commerce in endangered
species.” 7
The inadequacy of the 1966 and 1969 acts stimulated the development of the
Endangered Species Act of 1973. While both prior Acts attempted a kind of voluntary
preservation of endangered species, the 1973 Act, with its Section 9 takings prohibition,
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See Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966) (repealed 1973); Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83
Stat. 275 (1969) (repealed 1973).
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Endangered Species Preservation Act §2(b).
7
Designating Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act: Habitat Protection
Versus Agency Discretion, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 209, 235 (2000)

is prohibitive in nature. A prohibitive policy outlaws certain activity outright. The
difficulty with this kind of policy occurs when the costs of prohibition are not balanced
against any discernable benefit. To Congress, of course, these benefits were obvious—
the preservation of endangered species had the potential for great positive value for the
planet as a whole. But for those tasked with assuming these prohibitions, especially
private individuals, these benefits that Congress identified were not clearly ascertainable.
It is of particular curiosity that regulated industry—those who would be most burdened
by the Act’s application—made no protests during the Act’s legislative process.8 As a
result of this, as one scholar put it, “Congress defined the law prohibitively because no
one told them not to.”9
The Endangered Species Act implements its overall directive through a complex
series of mandates and prohibitions. An “endangered species” under the Act is any
species of plant, fish or wildlife “which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a
significant portion of its range.”10 A “threatened species” is “any species of plant, fish, or
wildlife which is likely to become endangered species within the foreseeable future
throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” 11 It is the primary responsibly of the
Secretary of Interior or the Secretary of Commerce to designate animals as either

8

See generally Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1972: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. On the Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972).
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S. Yaffee, PROHIBITIVE POLICY: IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES
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“endangered” or “threatened.”12 Any interested person may petition to have a species
designated as endangered, or removed from the list.13 A petitioner must present
substantial scientific evidence in order to support an endangered designation.14 Once a
species has been identified as endangered, it is also the responsibility of the Secretary of
the Interior to, concurrently, “designate any habitat of such species which is then
considered to be a critical habitat.”15 The Act defines a critical habitat as:
[T]he specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the species, at the
time it is listed in accordance with section 4…on which are found those physical
or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and (II) which
may require special management considerations or protection; and…specific areas
outside the geographical area occupied by the species at the time it is
listed…upon a determination by the Secretary that such areas are essential for the
conservation of the species.
In addition, “[t]he Secretary may exclude any area from critical habitat if he
determines that the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such
area as part of the critical habitat, unless he determines, based on the best scientific and
commercial data available, that the failure to designate such area as critical habitat will
result in the extinction of the species concerned.” 16 A final regulation designating
critical habitat of an endangered species is published concurrently with the final
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regulation determining that a species is endangered or threatened.17 Section 7 of the Act
states that federal agencies must not let their actions jeopardize endangered or threatened
species or their critical habitats.18 While Section 7 is targeted at federal agencies and
federal projects, Section 9 prohibits private “takings.”19 This section makes it unlawful
for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to “take”, within the
meaning of the Act, any species within the United States designated as endangered, and
considerably broadens the prohibitions of Section 7.20 To take within the meaning of the
Act is to “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to
attempt to engage in any such conduct.” 21 The Fish and Wildlife Service has defined
“harm” to be “an act which actually kills or injures wildlife.22 Such act may include
significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures the
endangered specie.23
Section 10 also provides for various ways in which the Secretary may issue a
permit or allow for an exemption in order to circumvent the taking prohibition.24
According to this section of the Act, “[t]he Secretary may permit…any taking otherwise
prohibited by section 1538(a)(1)(B) of this title if such taking is incidental to, and not the
purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.”25 The petitioner requesting
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a permit must submit to the Secretary a conservation plan that outlines the steps the
applicant will take to mitigate whatever impact results from the taking, what alternatives
the applicant considered and why those alternatives are not possible.26 The Secretary can
issue the permit after an opportunity for public comment. The Act also includes an
exemption for hardship, and provides:
If any person enters into a contract with respect to a species of fish or wildlife or
plant before the date of the publication in the Federal Register of notice of
consideration of that species as an endangered species and the subsequent listing
of that species as an endangered species pursuant to section 1533 of this title will
cause undue economic hardship to such person under the contract, the Secretary,
in order to minimize such hardship, may exempt such person from the application
of section 1538(a) of this title to the extent the Secretary deems appropriate if
such person applies to him for such exemption and includes with such application
such information as the Secretary may require to prove such hardship; except that
(A) no such exemption shall be for a duration of more than one year from the date
of publication in the Federal Register of notice of consideration of the species
concerned, or shall apply to a quantity of fish or wildlife or plants in excess of
that specified by the Secretary; (B) the one-year period for those species of fish or
wildlife listed by the Secretary as endangered prior to December 28, 1973, shall
expire in accordance with the terms of section 668cc-3 of this title; and (C) no
such exemption may be granted for the importation or exportation of a specimen
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See U.S.C.A. § 1539 (1988).

listed in Appendix I of the Convention which is to be used in a commercial
activity.27
Together these provisions form the basis of the Act’s mechanism in protecting
endangered species. While Section 4 is tasked with identifying those species that are
endangered, Sections 7 and 9 provide substantive protections by prohibiting certain
human conduct, subject only to the exemptions in Section 10. As a result, Sections 7 and
9, those Sections that are seen as prohibitive, have stimulated the most criticism.
2. The Act’s Legislative Intent
The stated purpose of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 is “to provide for
conservation, protection and propagation of endangered species of fish and wildlife by
Federal action and by encouraging the establishment of State endangered species
conservation programs.” 28 Congress also recognized, with considerable alarm, that half
of the recorded extinctions of animals in the past two thousand years had occurred in
merely the past fifty years.29 Congress acknowledged the importance of these species,
not only for their aesthetic qualities, but also for their importance in maintaining balance
and health within Earth’s ecosystems. “In hearings before the Subcommittee on the
Environment it was shown that many of these animals perform vital biological services to
maintain a ‘balance of nature’ within their environments. Also revealed was the need for
biological diversity for scientific purposes.” 30 Congress at this time also acknowledged
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16 U.S.C.A. § 1539(b) (1988).
SR No. 93-307, US Code Cong & Adm News 2989 (1973).
See 119 cong. Rec. 30, 165 (1973) (statement of Rep. Grover).
S. Rep. No. 93-307, at 2, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2990.

that the two major causes of species extinction were hunting and habitat destruction, and
as a result, the Act focused on maintaining habitat in order to protect endangered or
threatened species.31 In fact, many of the legislative proceedings during 1973 convey this
need to protect threatened wildlife. The Report of the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries on H.R. 37 (a bill that included many of the fundamental attributes
of the 1973 Act) stated:
From the most narrow possible point of view, it is the best interests of mankind to
minimize the losses of genetic variations. The reason is simple: they are potential
resources. They are keys to puzzles which we cannot solve, any may provide
answers to questions which we have not learned to ask…Who knows, or can say,
what potential cures for cancer or other scourges, present or future, may lie locked
up in the structures of plants which may yet be undiscovered, much less
analyzed?...Sheer self-interest impels us to be cautious.32
It is clear from this passionate appeal that for Congress, this was not simply about
preventing the extinction of singular, innocuous animal and plant species. It was instead
intended as a comprehensive solution to the planet’s continued degradation— an Act that
the very survival of the human race, and the planet, depended on. On the other hand,
there is no evidence in the legislative history that Congress considered the practical
effects of protecting, and in doing so, prohibiting a taking of, every single species in
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Id.
H.R.Rep.No.93-412, pp. 4-5 (1973).

danger of extinction. Despite this, it is apparent that Congress had a dire concern for the
conservation of species and “deemed the extinction of any species intolerable.”33
3. Stringent Application and Amendment of the Act: Tennessee Valley Authority
v. Hill and Palila v. Hawaii
Among the many cases interpreting the Endangered Species Act, Tennessee
Williams Authority v. Hill and Palila v. Hawaii both stand out as key examples of the
Act’s potential power with stringent application. Both cases also prompted considerable
amendment of the Act by Congress.
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, often considered to be the most significant
piece of Endangered Species Act litigation, stands as a testament to Section 7’s powerful
potential. In that case, environmental groups brought action against the Tennessee Valley
Authority to enjoin them from completing an impoundment and dam (Tellico Dam
Project) on the Little Tennessee River.34 The area that the Authority intended to dam had
been designated as the “critical habitat” of a species of fish called the snail darter.35
Environmental groups claimed that the actions of the Tennessee Valley Authority in
completing their dam would result in the extinction of the snail darter, and therefore, was
in violation of the Endangered Species Act.36 The Tennessee Valley Authority, in
contrast, argued that the Act did not “prohibit the completion of a project authorized,
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See Cameron Coggins and Irma S. Russell, Beyond Shooting Snail Darters in Pork
Barrels: Endangered Species and Land Use in America, 70 GEO. L.J. 1433, 1460 (1982).
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Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
35
Id.
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Id at 153.

funded, and substantially constructed before the Act was passed.”37 Thus, the key issue
before the court was whether it was required to enjoin the operation of a nearly
completed dam.38 The district court, despite the Act’s strong language, concluded that
Congress could not have possibly intended the Act’s prohibitions to apply to almost
complete federal projects.39 Thus, the court at the trial level refused to enjoin completion
of the dam, and in doing so, utilized a kind of equitable balancing test. The Sixth Circuit,
in contrast, reversed the district court’s decision.
The Supreme Court’s decision, in affirming the Sixth Circuit, both emphasized
and solidified Congress’ strong intent. The Court began its analysis by reiterating the
Act’s authorization of the Secretary “to issue such regulations as it deems necessary and
advisable to provide for the conservation of such [endangered] species”40 and that the
Secretary had promulgated regulations declaring the snail darter endangered, “whose
critical habitat would be destroyed by the creation of the Tellico Dam.”41 The court then
held that the Endangered Species Act specifically requires that construction of the dam be
enjoined in order to prevent the extinction of the snail darter. The court goes on to
explain that there is nothing in the plain terms of § 7 of the Act that mentions that it
cannot apply to federal projects that were already underway at the time of the Acts
enactment.42 The Court went even further to note that, “Congress intended endangered
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Id at 162.
Id. at 156.
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Hill v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
40
16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1976 ed.)
41
Tennessee Valley, 437 U.S. at 172.
42
Id.
38

species to be afforded the highest of priorities” and barred any use of the district court’s
balancing approach to limit the force of the Act.43
Tennessee Valley is considered a landmark case for many reasons. First, as one of
the very first cases challenging the authority of §7 of the Act, it is indicative of the Act’s
sheer force. Second, this case lays out the essential conflict that will come to plague the
Act for years to come—the battle between the apparent power of the Act and its stated
aims, and the economic interests that appear to contradict those aims. The court even
acknowledges the perhaps illogical nature of the Act in noting: “[i]t may seem curious to
some that the survival of a relatively small number of three-inch fish among all the
countless millions of species extant would require the permanent halting of a virtually
completed dam for which Congress has expended more that $100 million. The paradox
is not minimized by the fact that Congress continued to appropriate large sums of public
money for the project, even after congressional Appropriations Committees were
apprised of its apparent impact upon the survival of the snail darter.”44 Yet it is clear
from the Court’s that economic considerations will not stop the Court from implementing
Congress’ intent.
In 1978, in reaction to Tennessee Valley, Congress amended the Act in an attempt
to alleviate its severity.45 Most of these amendments revolved around Sections 4 and 7
and a revamp of the definition of critical habitat. The amendments also created an
Endangered Species Act committee to grant exemptions to the Section 7 prohibition.
43

Id at 173.
Tennessee Valley, 437 U.S. at 172.
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H.R. Rep. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 9453.
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Despite these amendments, at this time, Congress remained committed to the Act’s
premise, even defeating three proposed amendments in the Senate that threatened to
immobilize the Act.46
In 1988, Congress further amended the Act in an attempt to deal with the effects
of their 1978 amendments, where the listing process was significantly halted in a reaction
to the Tennessee Valley case.47 Congress noted that “nearly 1,000 new species have been
identified for candidates that warrant listing and protection under the Act” and yet, “only
about 50 species are being added to the Act’s lists every year…”48 Thus, Congress
ordered the Secretary “to monitor the status of all candidate species” and to “make
prompt use of the authority under paragraph 7 to prevent a significant risk to the well
being of any such species.” It is clear from the back and forth of these amendments, that
Congress was grappling with how to best effectuate its purpose in the face of growing
opposition to the Act after the Tennessee Valley case.
While Tennessee Valley serves as the landmark interpretation of Section 7 of the
Act, Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources demonstrated Section
9’s power, and, like Tennesee Valley, engendered its own set of reforms.
The Palila, a bird found only in Hawaii, was listed as an endangered species in
1967 and the Fish and Wildlife Service designed a critical habitat for the Palila in 1977.49
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Endangered Species Act Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Resource
Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works,95th Cong., 1st Sess.
542 (1977).
47
Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-478, 1988.
48
Id.
49
Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw.
1979), aff’d, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).

The habitat is located in the mamane-naio forest on the slopes of Mauna Kea.50 For thirty
years prior to this habitat designation, Hawaii had maintained herds of feral sheep and
goats in a game management zone on the same slopes of Mauna Kea.51 The game
management area is maintained by the Hawaii Department of Land and Natural
Resources and the sheep and goats are used for sport-hunting purposes.52 The problem
with the presence of these feral animals, was that they had “a destructive impact on the
mamane-naio ecosystem.”53 Because of this, the Fish and Wildlife Service concluded
“that the eradication of the sheep and goats were necessary to achieve the regeneration of
the forest and restoration of the Palila.”54 The Sierra Club and others brought action on
behalf of the Palila, alleging that Hawaii’s practice of maintaining these sheep and goats
was in violation of the Endangered Species Act.55 The court was primarily concerned
with determining whether the State’s action constituted a taking under the Act.56 The
District Court, and then Ninth Circuit, ultimately held that defendants had violated
Section 9 of the Act by maintaining feral sheep and goats in the Plila’s critical habitat.57
The Ninth Circuit stated that “defendants’ action in maintaining feral sheep and goats in
the critical habitat is a violation of the Act since it was shown that the Palila was
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1979), aff’d, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
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endangered by the activity.”58 In essence, the Court, through its holding, adhered to a
broad interpretation of a Section 9 taking, finding that a taking had occurred despite the
fact that plaintiffs failed to show that the Palila population was declining.59
In response to the court’s interpretation in Palila of Section 9 of the Act,
Congress once again undertook a series of reforms. Yet similar to the reforms that
occurred after the Tennessee Valley case, these amendments sought to merely clarify the
Act, not degrade it. In 1982, the Fish and Wildlife Service revised its definition of the
term “harm” and Congress enacted a limited set of exceptions to Section 9’s taking
prohibition. Similar to the amendments of Section 7 in 1978 following Tennessee Valley,
the 1982 amendments were not intended to dismantle the Act in any way.
ANALYSIS:
1. Public Criticism and Congressional Backlash Against the Act
The regulation of endangered species through Section 7 and, in particular, Section
9 of the Act has generated an enormous amount of controversy and criticism. Yet
beneath this controversy, there exists a genuine problem. “Ninety percent of the listed
endangered species on private land…[and] two-thirds of listed species have more than 60
percent of their total habitat on private land.”60 Despite these realities, Section 9 has
often been criticized as merely a tool with which the federal government controls private
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land use. Many have even argued that “Section 9 of the ESA is one…incremental step in
the federalization of land use regulation.”61
While the seed of criticism was certainly planted with high profile cases that
showcased the Act’s power, like Tennessee Valley and Palila, the backlash surrounding
the Act skyrocketed into the public consciousness through a series of highly publicized
incidents in the 1990s. In 1992, in a speech to the logging community in Colville,
Oregon, President Bush, in assailing the Act it as a “broken” law that “will not stand”,
captures the essence of the public sentiment at this time:62
The Endangered Species Act was intended as a shield for species against the
effects of major construction projects like highways and dams, not a sword aimed
at the jobs, families and communities of entire regions like the Northwest…It’s
time to put people ahead of owls.63
The controversy that inspired this statement—the conflict between defenders of the
Northern Spotted Owl and the logging industry—shot the Endangered Species Act into a
state of both prominence and contention. The Northern Spotted Owl makes its home in
the forests of the Pacific Northwest. These same trees that the owls live in are the source
of the billion dollar logging industry. In 1986, a concerned environmental group
petitioned the Fish and Wildlife Service to list the owl as endangered, largely, they
argued, due to the decimation of the owl’s habitat by heavy logging.64 The FWS listed
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Michael Wines, Bush, in Far West, Sides With Loggers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1992, at
A25.
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the owl as threatened in 1990.65 Subsequently, logging in the critical habitat of the
Northern Spotted Owl was halted in 1991 after the Court in Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities held that the “Secretary’s definition of ‘harm’, within [the]
meaning of the ESA provision defining ‘take’, as including ‘significant habitat
modification or degradation that actually kills or injures wildlife’ was reasonable.”66
The response of the logging industry was pure outrage. Experts within the
industry predicted that approximately 30,000 jobs would be lost because of the Supreme
Court’s holding. In turn, the controversy pitted both industry and individuals associated
with the logging community against environmentalists. In response, and in a hope to
compromise, the Clinton administrative enacted the Northwest Forest Plan in 1994,
which was intended to protect the majority of owls, while still allowing for some harvest
of timber.67 While the results of the ESA’s taking prohibition, and even the Northwest
Forest Plan was certainly much less logging, and the loss of jobs; as of this year, the
Northern Spotted Owl population continues to decline by 7.3 percent per year.68
In 1988, the FWS determined the Kangaroo Rat to be an endangered species for
purposes of the Act.69 The Kangaroo Rat is native to the Perris and San Jacinto Valleys
in western Riverside County and the San Luis Rey and Temecula Valleys in northern San
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Determination of Threatened Status of Northern Spotted Owl, 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114
(June 26, 1990).
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Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687
(1995).
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See generally U.S. Forest Serv. & Bureau of Land Mgmt., Record of Decision for
Amendments to Forest Serv. and Bureau of Land Mgmt. Planning Documents Within the
Range of the Northern Spotted Owl (1994) (hereinafter Record of Decision).
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Olympic Peninsula Audubon Society, available at olympicpeninsulaautobon.org.
69
53 Fed. Reg. 38.

Diego County in the state of California. In its determination, the FWS noted that that
“[t]he lands now held in public ownership are not sufficient to ensure the maintenance of
the species in perpetuity. Consequently, the preservation of many presently privately
owned parcels likely will be necessary.”70 In October of 1993, a wildfire near Riverside,
California led to the destruction of 29 homes. Many homeowners alleged that the spread
of the fire and loss of homes was caused by the Department of the Interior’s U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service’s protection of the kangaroo rat. Homeowners further claimed that
their inability to build firebreaks around their homes was due to the required conservation
of the kangaroo rat’s habitat. “Specifically, the homeowners alleged that a prohibition of
‘disking’ for weed abatement—an annual process of reducing the amount of vegetation
around homes to provide a protective barrier from wildfires—precluded them from
adequately protecting their homes.”71 The prohibition against disking in the Riverside
area was adopted because of the County’s concerns about violating the terms of the
Endangered Species Act.72
Unsurprisingly, this tragic event and its connection to the provisions of the
Endangered Species Act engendered significant outrage and media coverage. It also
caught the attention of Congress. Former Louisiana House Representative W.J. “Billy”
Tauzin lamented:
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72
Id.
71

Something is fundamentally wrong in our country when a rat’s home is more
important than an American’s home. At the rate we’re going, it won’t be long
before we’re forced the add people to the Endangered Species List.73
Both the public, and crucially, Congress, had lost sight of the Act’s initial purpose as a
result of these, and several other less high-profile incidents. Through this sentiment, the
Act became a matter of humans versus animals; dire economic interests versus
amorphous environmental concerns; life versus death.
2. Consequences of Stringent Application and Backlash
The Act’s power and subsequent backlash has created the perverse incentive for
landowners to preemptively destroy habitats in fear of the Act’s prohibitions. This
startling result casts doubt on the effectiveness of the Act, and ultimately, its prohibitive
regulatory scheme.
In the pine forests of Boiling Spring Lakes, North Carolina, often home to the redcockaded woodpecker, a bird listed as endangered by the Fish and Wildlife Service,
landowners routinely cut down trees when they notice the beginnings of infiltration of the
nesting woodpeckers.74 In other words, “when a landowner felt that his property was
turning into the sort of habitat that might attract a nesting pair of woodpeckers, he rushed
in to cut down the trees.”75 In Tucson, Arizona, landowners waged a similar war against
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the cactus ferruginous pygmy owl. In that region, landowners are also clearing their land
in order to prevent a critical habitat designation, and thus, effective federal control over
their land and economic loss. This kind of preemptive behavior is all too common
throughout the United States. In fact, a 1996 developers’ guide from the National
Association of Home Builders advises: “[t]he highest level of assurance that a property
owner will not face an E.S.A. issue is to maintain the property in such a condition that
protected species cannot occupy the property.”76 The prohibitive nature of the Act
incentivizes landowners to simply get rid of the problem instead of having to deal with
expected losses. These harmful incentives, coupled with the Act’s poor public
perception, have rendered a once powerful measure significantly damaged. These
growing rebellions by landowners represent a failure of the prohibitive nature of the
Act—without discernable benefits or incentives, most landowners’ priorities
understandably remain those which are most imminent, principally economic survival.
3. The Act and Prohibitive Policy: What Went Wrong?
The Endangered Species Act seemed to have everything in place at the outset to
become a successful federal policy—unlike its predecessors, it not only had a clear goal,
but also the management tools needed to enforce such a scheme. And yet, why has the
Act engendered such backlash, and then, as a result, failed to accomplish its initial
purpose? Part of the problem, of course, is the altered perception of the Act through
continued criticism. As Federico Cheever puts it, in his article Road to Recovery: A New
Way of Thinking About the Endangered Species Act, “[w]hen discussion focuses on
76
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whether section 9 prohibits logging in the Pacific Northwest or section 7 prevents
construction of a federal dam, the underlying justification for the Endangered Species
Act—that prudence dictates that we preserve the biological diversity on which we
depend—is obscured.”77 It is clear that public and political discourse has dominated the
commendable intentions of the Act.
The problem may also lie in the federal prohibitive regulatory scheme in general.
It is clear from the Act’s predecessors that voluntary approaches to wildlife preservation
have failed. Therefore, it seems natural that the Act would contain strong substantive
mandates and prohibitions. Yet in a way, the application of the Act’s prohibitions has
been its downfall, and has, in effect, overshadowed its crucial purpose. Steven Yaffee
has argued in his book, Prohibitive Policy: Implementing the Federal Endangered Species
Act, that prohibitive policy is at its most effective when it is clear that the risks involved
in engaging in the prohibited policy are very large.78 While experts understand the grave
risks involved in the extinction of species, it is difficult for an average citizen to
comprehend these risks, especially when the Act effectively prohibits activity that’s
benefits are immediately apparent. In turn, without any tangible, comprehensible benefits
accrued from a regulatory scheme that is prohibitive, the prohibitions simply do not seem
worth it—in contrast, they feel intrusive, even dangerous. Indeed, “law, if not a part of
morality, is limited by it.”79 While the context of these words by Oliver Wendell Holmes
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is more extreme, they still have some application here—the public will instinctively balk
at prohibitive regulation that does not align with its own ideas of what is important.
Holmes continued by noting that, “…this limit of power is not coextensive with any
system of morals. For the most part it falls far within the lines of any such system, and in
some cases may extend beyond them, for reasons drawn from the habits of a particular
people at a particular time.”80 As evidenced from the pervasive preemptive destruction of
critical habitats, landowners, in weighing the risks of engaging in the Act’s prohibited
policy, are choosing to engage. They are choosing to engage because, to them, the risks
involved in not engaging appear dire.
CONCLUSION:
In order for the Act’s prohibitive nature to be effective, the general public needs
to be educated about the intrinsic benefits of species preservation. The general public
needs not only to be educated, but it also needs to be excited, it needs to be filled with the
kind of anxiety and drive that supports the most successful of government initiatives. Yet
our current public perception of the Act and its prohibitive mandates stands as a
significant roadblock to this pursuit of enlightenment, so to speak. At its core, the
controversy surrounding the Endangered Species Act begs a larger question. Who is the
Act protecting? Of course, on its surface, the Act protects those species designated as
endangered by the Fish and Wildlife Service. But when viewing the Act in its larger
sense, and acknowledging its legislative history, it is clear that its concerns are much
greater. The extinction of Earth’s plant and animal species has an everlasting effect on
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Earth’s ecosystem, and ultimately, on our survival as human beings. In a deteriorating
environment, we deteriorate. The suffering is far greater than the loss of some obscure,
innocuous creature, or the loss of superficial aesthetic appeal—it is systemic.

